The Harvard Tender

Genc Pollo

"500 thousand euros for Harvard professors, 320 thousand euros for us with two school classes!"

The above sentence is so emblematic of the state's current situation and so spicy in revealing the morals of a section of our society that I can bet it will become at least a campaign slogan; it would normally be missed as a reference in governance studies and with a bit of luck it could be included in future textbooks.

This sentence is an sms accidentally intercepted by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation that a head of procurement in a large state-owned company (K-sh.a.) sends to her titular boss, the company's administrator. It is about a contract worth 820 thousand euros (99.8% of the limit fund) of CMA shpk. (a consulting studio) in January 2020. The High State Control in a 20-page audit report in May 2022 on this contracting notes that K-sh.a. there was no tag for service procurement (sector strategy) and that these detailed strategies exist and were approved by the government a year ago; so buying the service was unnecessary. Further, any details of these strategies for K-sh.a. it was the task of a small directorate within the company, for which there was an agreement for assistance from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). KLSh further lists a series of legal violations but also comical details such as CMA collects information on K-sh.a. from Taxes, INSTAT and the Bank of Albania when the latter receive such information from K-sh.a.. Also KLSh concludes that CMA does not fulfill the criteria in force for personnel, does not have the expertise for the given task; KLSh is not convinced by some cvs that CMA presents, such as from Harvard University's Growth Lab.

On top of all that KLSh notes comes the sms of the head of procurement, who with an undeniable sense of black humor as well as a light dose of servile self-humiliation, informs the titular boss (administrator of K-sh.a) that they will they receive a bribe of 40% of the value of the contract (320,000 out of a total of 820,000 euros).

The Harvard tender is a pure case of the verification of personal responsibility. This concept, so dear to the prime minister whenever corruption scandals erupt in the government, is not abstract. If KLSh and sms show corruption in the state company, the responsible minister is asked to explain how he reacted to the audit of KLSh in May 2022 (for sms the defendant can claim, "pears on the back" etc.). This hope fades if you listen to the minister in question as he answers the opposition's questions in a parliamentary committee regarding similar tenders. "I will take you to SPAK with the video of this question" was the only clarification. However, this is not a reason not to ask the minister the question as above orally and in writing.

The Harvard tender is also a pure case of the criminal conception of the official act. As the Maltese judge Depasquale wrote in the verdict in the VGH case that incriminated the former Prime Minister Muscat (see my note "Maltese example" July 8, 2024 in this media) "the financial fraud was committed during three stages of the process: before the start of the procedure, during the negotiations and with signing the contract; so there was a criminal collusion between the government and the company (concessionaire)". Even SPAK theoretically approaches this concept with the 2023 annual report, where it notes that in PPP tenders: "we observe direct interventions by high public officials, who negotiate in advance, even without announcing the tender/concession procedure with the legal entity, which then the winner will be announced" (p.34).

But the SPAK for this form of criminal offense has remained at the theoretical level until today.

Will the SPAK (following it the court) conclude that in the Harvard Tender we have this type of criminal collusion? That remains to be seen.

But it is certain that in a clear criminal agreement, such as the cases of the incinerators in Fier and Elbasan, SPAKu failed to put the dots on i; the charges were for illegality and routine corruption against persons below the level of conception/approval of the fraudulent scheme.

Will SPAKu do the same with the Tirana incinerator with the investigations that are being prolonged without conclusion? That too remains to be seen?

1. S. Zbulëse: the administrator of K-sh.a. he was an appreciated director in the Berisha government; as a minister, I cooperated with him for five years and left with good impressions.