The Berisha-Meta agreement: turning the opposition into the opposition

political

Sali Berisha and Ilir Meta have signed an agreement today, which at first glance seems electoral, but basically, it is for the state and democracy.

The points of an ascetic document, in the sense that it does not try to be a pretentious and megalomaniacal platform like the Pact for Europe, reached in April 2013 between Rama and Meta, compressed into less than three pages, is, first, the institutionalization of an opposition front.

Berisha and Meta, in some way, have gone to war together for things that normally separate them. For Sali Berisha, it is important that the primaries are recognized even outside the Democratic Party, legitimizing them in extra-party terms, while for Ilir Meta, the fact of PL's revival is in focus.

To a considerable extent, Berisha and Meta are both owners of the houses that they inherited to their 'descendants' - in the case of the Doctor 'political son' and Meta's wife - only to find them dilapidated.

Meta has sketched the fight for municipal councils as a way to return, and this is a rational decision because it connects the party's votes with representation in local parliaments, avoiding many losses and many frictions that it would encounter if it sought free areas for mayoral candidates.

The greatest account, however, must be sought of perception. In this respect, the local opposition coalition increases the quota by a few points, due to the strength it emits in the unification policy.

Long electoral trains have always created superiority, even in conditions where superiority was not needed, if we remember, for example, the alliance between the democrats and the social democrats in the early 90s. 

The agreement should also signal the 'democratic factions' concentrated without concentrating on the parliamentary group favored by Alibeaj. The PD-PL union removes any illusion of a rumored alliance (always a betrayal) between Rama and Meta. The pressure that falls on the 'Alibeaj group' already comes from both sides. Morally they can fight in the fields without the benefits of the theory 'we are the virtuosos in the Bermuda triangle, but electorally they turn into political relics. Seen as traitors to the opposition and a 'ready set of ministries' of power, any political credit will fall into the deep abyss offered by strong bipolar conflicts.

While there is still time and time to agree, an early agreement would also put them in the system. If they do not move in that direction, they have no political future ahead. 

In this sense, the Berisha-Meta agreement has clarified many things. The surest of these is that those who linger long on the shores of battle may trade war, but not its history.