Why do the interior ministers have no 'luck' with Rama?

Alfred Lela

Taulant Balla will be the fifth interior minister of Edi Rama in 10 years of power and in the third governing mandate. No one can say for sure whether he will complete this term or not. Rama's governments have been uncertain about interior ministers and convalescent for experimental ministers, a new type of political representation such as Gent Cakaj or Bora Muzhaqi, etc., that the prime minister has brought to the cabinet to fulfill his whims and to detoxify his government as much as he could.

As for the Ministers of the Interior, who are charged with the job of controlling the villains but have often become such themselves, most of them have gone under as spoilers of the government's and Rama's propaganda, and not due to the impossibility of the fight against crime, failure to convey the government's philosophy concerning order and security, etc.

In this sense, the question that can be asked is not: why doesn't Rama have luck with the Interior's ministers, but why don't they have luck with Rama?

The answer, I think, is simple. Rama does not see and does not charge them with the heavy and noble work of the guard of order, security, and public interest, but as sandpaper that smooths the cracks of public relations.

For Rama, the uniform, the lack of a belly, the stars of the fallen on the wall of the Ministry of Interior, etc., are more important than police corruption, community policing, and public trust. Even the latter, part of the PR operation, is gained by simulating, not working.

For Rama, it has been important that the Ministers of the Interior are passionate against the opposition, such as Sandër Leshaj, or a blind force against the building of the National Theater and its defenders.

For those who directly threaten public security, the philosophy of the SP government is summed up in the phrase of the Prime Minister 'May they bring each other demise.'

However, this is not the most significant obstacle the prime minister has thrown at the feet of those he designated interior ministers. Such a functionary is impossible to act or articulate as long as the state and the apparatus of violence, which it is a part, does not have statist (state) but political (power) goals.

In Fushë Krujë, e.g., not the Minister of the Interior who failed, but his boss Rama and his successor in office, Taulant Balla. If Rama licensed Rrahman Rraja and others like him for the umpteenth time, which later became the 'Rraja phenomenon,' Balla ensured that the phenomenon was not harmed but enforced in the area of ​​Kruja unimpeded. The case of the Fushë-Kruja Commissariat, and the intervention of MP Balla, which led to the exiling of the police officer, Nuhu, clearly shows this.

So, in the final, Rraja's resignation, Çuçi's dismissal, and Balla's appointment are internal and normal relations of the Socialist Party government. As people say, 'What you see is what you get.'

As such, the case does not show the crisis of governance but its absence. Going from crisis to crisis, this type of government has canceled all crises and has become the crisis itself.

In this sense, the interior ministers have no luck with Rama, nor will they.